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Liquidity Management around Seasoned Equity Offerings 
David T.L. Slu & Robert W. Faff 
UQ Business School, University of Queensland, Australia 
Abstract 
We investigate firms' liquidity practices around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We 
broadly classify issuers on the basis of whether the firm belongs to an industry deemed 
to be financially constrained or unconstrained. We find that constrained-industry issuers 
tend to save more cash to conserve funding capacity in anticipating investment. 
Unconstrained industry issuers, in contrast, carry high debt and limited cash reflecting a 
sizable financial leash. We also find that the former firms experience significant cash 
stockpiling following new equity issues, whereasforthe lattergroup, there is a significant 
decline in long-term debt. In the long run, unconstrained issuers who aggressively manage 
liquidity pre-issue have lower operating profit. However, the relation does not hold for 
market-based performance because investors, observingthe liquidity information, quickly 
discount stock value at the time of the offering. Rather, post-issue market under-
performance can be attributed to investors' downward revisions relating to the transitory 
nature of investment opportunities.	 - 
Key words: Liquidity management, seasoned equity offerings, long run performance 
JEL classification: i314, G32, M4, M41 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we study corporate liquidity management around the SEO decision and its 
relation to post-issue performance.' In particular, we seek to answer the following 
questions: (1) Do issuers manage their liquidity policies differently compared to industry 
non-issuers? And, if so, (2) How do liquidity policies affect the way firms conduct their 
issuance and financial decisions? (3) Does aggressive/conservative liquidity management 
affect the firm's future performance? 
Correspondence: David T.L. Siu; Email: t.siubusiness.uq.edu.au  
Robert W. Faff; Email: r.faffbusinessuq.edu .ou 
Corporate liquidity is recognized as a driving force behind financial decisions of a firm and is a 
meaningful component of financial structure (see, e.g., Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998; Almeida, 
Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; Faulkender & Wang, 2006; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Almeida, 
Campello, & Hackbarth, 2011). Meanwhile, seasoned equity offerings (SEO5) are one of the most 
important forms of capital-raising mechanisms, as asserted by the seminal discussion of Myers 
and Majluf (1984) as to how liquidity (in the form of financial slack) can disentangle the issue-
invest decision and affect investment. Since then, however, the role of liquidity has been largely 
overlooked in the literature.
David T.L. Siu & Robert W. Faff 
Drawing from recent research concerning the interplay between cash and debt policies 
in the financial constraints literature, we compare the liquidity policies used by Hi-Tech 
issuers to those from non-technology industries - which we characterize broadly as 
"constrained" and "unconstrained" issuers using the pooled industry median net debt ratio 
as the cut-off point. We characterize the higher cash stock (compared to industry non-
issuers) by constrained issuers as consistent with investment timing—with higher funding 
capacity allowing firms to take advantage when investment opportunities arise. In contrast, 
unconstrained issuers are characterized byvery high debt and low cash relative to industry 
peers - consistent with firms issuing equity to resolve their near-term liquidity problems. 
To provide deeper insights into liquidity changes around the offering period, we 
proceed to model four common sources of funds (i.e. change in cash, change in short-
term debt, asset sales and change in long-term debt) as our major liquidity variables. We 
develop a cross-sectional industry-based model to detect abnormal liquidity practices and 
formally estimate systematic patterns in each variable over the event period. In doing so, 
our model recognizes that firms' liquidity resource allocation depends on a policy mix of 
financial needs. We use the model to look more closely at period-to-period abnormal 
changes in liquidity and how equity offerings, as a means of liquidity injection, can impact 
on the overall liquidity situation and real operational decisions. 
For a sample of 1612 seasoned equity offerings overthe period 1990-2006, we report 
evidence consistent with predictable liquidity patterns around SEOs. Forconstrained issuers, 
we observe a generally conservative liquidity strategy in the pre-issue period, consistent 
with the fact that these issuers tend to limit access to liquidity in anticipation of future 
investment opportunities. Furthermore, the asset-scaled abnormal change in cash and 
discretionary expenditure show dramatic increases in the offering year (median values of 
46.85% and 13.41%, respectively). In subsequent years, the asset-scaled abnormal cash 
flow from operations indicate improved cash flow performance relative to pre-issue levels. 
Together, these results are consistent with the cash stockpiling motivation for equity offers. 
They also suggest that issuers invest significant amounts on new product developments in 
which the project typically impacts future cash flows with initial discretionary expenses 
directed towards marketing and development objectives. 
For unconstrained issuers, we observe a rather restrictive liquidity strategy in the pre-
issue period. The asset-scaled abnormal change in long-term debt before and in the offering 
year have median values of 2.50% and -5.40%, respectively. This might reflect a debt-
related motivation for equity offers, presumably because the extremely high net debt 
condition might have prompted them to avoid debt issuance to cover existing debt 
payments (i.e. debt trap). The result is also consistent with the liquidity-need hypothesis 
of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010), where firms raise equity to resolve a near-term 
liquidity problem. 
Finally, we explore whether conservative/aggressive liquidity management pre-issues 
affect long-run performance. We rely on the liquidity-adjusted matching approach to 
generate control firms for both operating and return performance evaluations. This 
approach, while different from previous studies, allows us to draw unified comparisons of 
both operating and returns performance. Our main results are as follows. We find that 
(abnormal) operating performance improves within 2-3 years post-issue and then 
diminishes. This transitory operating improvement, however, is not accompanied by 
patterns in contemporaneous return performance (which is negative and deteriorating). 
While we dofind a negative relation between pre-issue liquidity management and operating 
performance post-issue for unconstrained issuers, such a relationship is not replicated in 
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the post-issue returns analysis. Our results suggest that return underperformance is related 
to the forward-looking behaviors of investors: liquidity information is observed/realized 
at the time of SEOs (thus insignificant in the return regression), while subsequent 
underperformance is related to investors' surprise attached to the transitory nature of the 
operating improvement from the corresponding investment opportunity. 
Our study complements several recent research articles on cash-related issues. In 
particular, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) find that the primary motive for selling 
equity is to overcome a near-term cash need from operations, with market-timing 
opportunities and lifecycle stage exerting only ancillary influences. 2 A number of other 
recent papers, however, focus on post-issue cash saving and the use of issue proceeds. 
Mclean (2011) finds a secular trend that issuers keep reserves of cash from issue proceeds 
and the phenomenon is regarded as being caused by increasing precautionary motives 
and declining operating cash flows over time. Kim and Weisbach (2008) provide 
international evidence on a "cash stockpiling" effect by high growth firms and interpret 
their findings as supportive of managers capitalizing on market timing rather than 
investment opportunities. The approach in our paper, in contrast to the above studies, 
goes beyond the narrow focus on cash-related issues and investigates the management 
aspects of corporate liquidity. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and 
sampling issues. Section 3 discusses the effects of financial constraints on firms' liquidity 
policies and issuance decisions. Section 4 presents the estimation methods and results on 
issuers' period-to-period liquidity management practices. Section  provides evidence on 
the relationship between liquidity and post-issue performance. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data and Sample Description 
The initial SEO sample consisted of 4761 US common stock public offerings from 1990 to 
2006 sourced from the Securities Data Company (SDC) New Issue database .3 The sample 
requires issuers to be listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, orAMEX and excludes 1) private and rights 
offerings; 2) pure secondary offerings; 3) unit offerings packages; 4) closed-end funds, 
unit investment trusts, ADRs, REITs, CD bank deposits, and limited partnerships; 5) non 
domestic offers; 6) issues with offer prices less than $54 Financial and market data are 
sourced from the CRSP-Compustat Merged (CCM) database. The investigation window is 
set from three years before to three years after the issue year. Years -1 and 0 are the 
indexed fiscal years before and after the issue date. 
Starting with the SDC sample, several data restrictions are imposed. First ) we exclude 
issues that occur within 2 years after a spin-off or merger to avoid any potential 
contamination effect between the two corporate events. Second, Issuers' data must be 
present and available on Compustat for the fiscal year preceding the issue date (i.e. year - 
1), and must have CRSP's returns data on the first month after the issue date or four 
They report that without the SEO proceeds, 62.6% of issuers would have run out of cash without 
the offer proceeds, and 81.8% would have had below normal cash holdings in the year after the 
offer. 
Our data period started in 1990 after the SFAS 95 came into effect for fiscal years ending after 
July 15, 1988 allowing us to obtain consistent and standardized measures for comparison. 
We did include mixed offerings that contain both primary and secondary shares. The inclusion 
allowed us to control for the differential effects of mixed offerings (in term of % offered) to post-
issue long-run performance. 
Journal of Finance and Financial Services Vol.1 NO. 1(2014)
6 David T.L. Siu & Robert W. Faff 
C -	 •	 = 
(0	 0	 = 
o	 o C 00,-4o-c000'HNNr'JenenerJ t2= , 00000	 NNJrlNNrrrNmci 
-fl 000000000000000000 
V 
-
C E 4 10 r- n	 is, is, en	 N rn en en ID N 2o
-
ni--oo0o000900Q99 
000000000000000000 3 
70 0
a, DO 
2 W 3 C 
(0
-o E< 00000 r- rN 
o 000ddodod000000000 
>c 
.E
G) 
C 0 
tEvt .2 
a, 
E .0 iN en Lb ne-rn -I 10	 N 00 N Lb ,-lrn Lu 'H 
Se4 . 2 ,. c 
=	 . Lfl 0 F-V C 
- 0-:- Co.-lLbLfloNo-lOt0000enm0tO 
> 0 0 W
.!= On	 M 9o>0
0 
-o= E
m60Nc00fl00.-la'0enNLnrnN 
rnrnLnff,N0tflNLflflJNOflJLDNtO E- •-1- -	 - -	 - '-1 en 
u (0E2L. 
o • o'Hr.Jn0'Ho0000mr-JeJNa1N 0 1.0 .fl± 
> .2	 to 2 en e- '-I u-i N en en LII N en en en N IN u-H - en en 0-
QJCLqQ 000 a, = 
-
2 
.-.
Ln00N00rnN0mONOL0rnONO 
oLnen.-ILnN,-1.-1	 (NNNJ'4N	 .H'1 
'-4 
00 00 
.0 a,
0 
a 
r.W Q
= = NLbN o00rnLnN,-I0000LnNNLOrn N4	 N 'H cogo o 0 .E2 (N 0 00 
N 
00(0	 -O 
_tto
Cl	 N	 Ltl tiI	 WI 
=obo 0 t5 Uri	 N Lb	 N	 0 
n2.ov O Lfl	 u-H	 N 
U en	 NLO 	 on	 r cr N	 LfleN-1	 r.Jrnen	 N 
Vl N en en Co en U, N 'H LI - en en 00 01 01 N	 N 
I•1 
•Eao 
>-=-olq
wE LI 
Inw -o &_ C DO	 = 
-
o fE V r0	 =	 .0	 LI 
= LI4-	 (0
- 
0  W oE	 00	 0 0	 =111 ==.2-.9-	 w	 .E U :2V 2C 
'-a,-:.2 0'- =10 =	 0.	 = 
$ fl a	 •LILato U . V	 oro.3	 a--o-- _-.Eo > a,C ()< C	 D.OU'-	 QCC 
= 
mc .CL.	 oc.S	 a, (0=fl	 E	 = 000 C Uo,ULUwO<W0I_I0ZU-UW 
Journal of Finance and Financial Services Vol.1 No.1(2014)
Liquidity Management around Seasoned Equity Offerings	 7 
Table 3 
Issuer Statistics Relative to Industry 
This table reports summary statistics of issuers classified into their respective industry rankings in the year prior 
to the SEO (year -1). Issuers are first divided into "constrained" and "unconstrained" groups according to the 
net debt-to-assets ratio relative to the pooled industry median (at 001) and then, within each group, they are 
assigned to one of three percentile thresholds (Low, Normal, High) in their respective industry. For example, 
among all credit-constrained issuers, 65.22% have cash/A exceeding the 70" percentile of their respective 
industry peers. The pooled industry median was calculated by pooling all non-issuer observations in the issuers' 
respective two-digit SIC industry. Variables across four fields are reported: liquidity position, long-term debt 
profile, financial constraints and investment opportunities. Liquidity and debt profile are indicators of internal 
liquidity resources- The last two fields are common proxies of external financing frictions and investment 
opportunities. Specifically, Altman's z-score is the unleveraged" measure of financial distress 13.3 * (pretax 
income) + sales + 1.4 * (retained earnings) + 1.2 • (current assets minus liabilities)]/assets, payout ratio is the 
ratio of total distributions (dividends and repurchases) to operating income. Firm size is total assets. Bond 
rating is a dummy equal 1 if the firm both lacks S&P long-term bond rating and reports positive debt, and 0 
otherwise. Cash flow is operating income before depreciation and amortization. Tobin's a is the market-to-
book value of assets. Issue proceeds are in 2005 million of dollars. "A" stands for ending period total assets. All 
variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
Variables
Constrained issuers 
(with net debt ratio <0.1) 
Low	 Normal	 High (<301h)	 (3170th)	 (>70th)
Unconstrained issuers 
(with net debt ratio >0.1) 
Low	 Normal	 High 
.	 (<301h)	 (3170)	 (>70th) 
Liquidity position 
Cash/A 2.34% 32.44% 65.22% 44.08% 46.35% 9,57% 
Short-term debt/A 51.17% 39.30% 9.53% 20.81% 51.18% 28.01% 
Asset sale/A 19.90% 55.18% 24.92% 29.19% 40.14% 30.67% 
Long-term debt/A 50.00% 39.46% 10.54% 5.23% 33.73% 61.05% 
Net debt/A 67.56% 32.44% 0.00% 4.04% 43.79% 52.17% 
Long-term debt profile 
Long-term debt issuance/A 46.48% 36.88% 16.64% 13.76% 30.28% 55.96% 
Long-term debt reduction/A 42.98% 42.13% 14.89% 15.70% 40.88% 43.43% 
Debt due in I year/A 49.08% 33.95% 16.97% 19.21% 46.73% 34.06% 
Debt maturing in 2'd year/A 52.26% 30.00% 17.74% 14.89% 41.74% 43.38% 
Debt maturing in 3" year/A 54.06% 28.54% 17.39% 13.19% 36.17% 50.64% 
Debt maturing in 411year/A 48.68% 36.60% 14.72% 12.81% 35.51% 51.69% 
Debt maturing in Sthyear/A 36.55% 51.33% 12.12% 13.06% 33.37% 53.56% 
Interest expense /A 8.57% 80.48% 10.95% 3.70% 35.19% 61.11% 
Financial distress and Constraint measures 
Altman's z-score 28.98% 42.38% 28.64% 14.34% 57.67% 27.99% 
Payout policy 6.70% 83.42% 9.88% 10,45% 62.43% 27.12% 
Firm size 14.05% 68.90% 17.06% 6.31% 47.04% 46.65% 
Bond ratings 60.27% (id) 59.20% (issuer) 39.45% (id) 47.83% (issuer) 
Investment opportunities 
Cash flow/A 32.78% 31.77% 35.45% 12.43% 53.06% 34.52% 
Capital expenditure/A 21.42% 41.32% 37.27% 22.16% 40.12% 37.72% 
Tobin's 0 3.68% 27.59% 68.73% 17.65% 53.16% 29.19%
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that of the pooled industry median, at 0.01.6 The formation of two groups reflects the 
manner in which firms display differential industry-specific preferences towards managing 
their cash and debt capacity as illustrated in Table 2. Then within each group, the statistics 
relating to issuers (measured in the year before the offering) are sorted into one of the 
three categories (Low, Normal, High) based on their percentile ranking (cutoffs at 30th 
and 70th) within the industry sample distribution. For example, an issuer having cash-to-
assets above (below) the 70 1I (301h) percentile among its industry peers is categorized as 
High (Low). This procedure repeats for each firm and for each dimension. The summary 
table reports the overall percentage of issuers statistics' which fall within the three 
categories. 
The distinctive liquidity characteristics of issuers relative to their industry peers are 
evident in Table 3. For the group of issuers with net debt-to-assets below industry median 
(i.e. those in high-tech industries), 65.22% are raised by firms with Large (above 70th 
industry percentile) cash-to-assets ratio, with only 2.34% at the Low (below 30th industry 
percentile) end of the industry distribution. Moreover, about half of the issuers' short-
term and long-term debt ratios are ranked Low. The liquidity patterns are also consistent 
with those reported in the debt profile panel, with the portion of debt maturing in future 
years tending to be Low and steady. Together, Low net debt issuers tend to have higher 
cash and more flexible debt capacity compared to the relatively constrained industry peers, 
yet why do they respond to costly external financing while others do not? 
To provide further insights, we examine some common measures related to the costs 
and benefits of external capital from the financial constraints literature:? (1) Altman's z-
score, (2) payout ratio, (3) firm size, (4) bond rating, (5) cash flow-to-assets, (6) capital 
expenditure-to-assets and, (7) Tobin's Q. The first four proxies pertain to the costs related 
to financial distress, information asymmetry or demand for liquidity, while the remaining 
ones capture benefits linked to financing investment if other sources of funding are not 
available or insufficient. Relevant to our purposes, there seems to exist no evidence in 
Table 3 that Low net debt issuers are particularly financially distressed or constrained, 
with a clear majority of issuers located within the Normal (30th to 70th) percentile range. 
In addition, analysis of investment demand reveals similarly indifferent percentile patterns 
in cash flows and capital expenditures. One major exception is the forward-looking Tobin's 
Q measure, with 69% of constrained issuers assigned to the High category. 
Collectively, these results suggest the use of external capital by Low net debt issuers 
for investment timing—withhigher liquidity weakening theirfinancial constraint restrictions 
The selection of the pooled industry median for cut-off is somewhat arbitrary, but at the 2-digit 
SIC level, our conclusion is qualitatively unaffected. 
These proxies follow the the large number of studies on the impact of financial constraints on 
corporate policies. Specifically, financial distress alone may drive differences in the way firms 
make their cash and debt choices (Almeida & campello, 2001); cash payouts are likely to be 
lower for constrained firms (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988); firms with smaller asset size 
are more vulnerable to capital market imperfections (Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995); market's 
assessment of  firm's credit quality differs under financial constraints (Whited, 1992); cash flow, 
Tobin's Q and capital expenditures are investment proxies that may pick up different information 
about investment demand (Almeida et al., 2004; Faulkender & Wang, 2006); asset sales is also 
included as another liquidity measure because it may influence investment expenditures for 
constrained firms (Hovakimian &Titman, 2006). Detailed variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A.
Journal of Finance and Financial Services Vol.1 No.1(2014)
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and encouraging investment. Our interpretation here is grounded upon the relationship 
between investment and liquidity which, according to Boyle and Guthrie (2003), has a 
first-order effect in accelerating investment underfinancing constraints. 9 Because projects 
have uncertain future value, the optimal policy is to invest onlywhen high-liquidity exceeds 
a positive threshold above the cost of external capital. In contrast, low-liquidity industry 
peers carry a higher cost of external financing that can reduce the attractiveness of 
investment. Overall, the salient feature concerning issuers' behavior here is that mostfirms 
have high liquidity before equity issuance in relatively constrained industries to complement 
investment opportunities.9 
Regarding issuers with net debt-to-assets above industry median (i.e. those in 
unconstrained industries), three main results emerge. First, the issuers' cash-to-assets 
distribution is heavily right skewed, with 44.08% and 9.57% of firms at the Low and High 
end of industry percentiles, respectively. Second, sufficiently high debt may curtail further 
debt issues before reaching distress levels, with over 61% of issuers reached an alarmingly 
High long-term debt-to-assets and a consistently large proportion of debt matures in the 
next five years. Finally, these issuers tend to be larger in size but have moderate profitability 
(cash flow) and investment prospects compared to their respective industry firms. 
Together, these results suggest the use of external capital by 'high' net debt issuers 
with a liquidity shortage - with lower cash and higher debt comes a sizable operating 
liquidity deficit relative to their internal cash flow (which is not particularly high within 
industry). The interpretation here also accords with the findings of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) and Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), who report that debt issues 
are positively related to a firm's fund flow deficit (i.e. a negative relation between debt 
issues and cash flows) for larger firms. 1° yet, large debt alone is not sufficient in itself to 
explain the question why these firms raise equity, as it does not take into account the 
overall effect of liquidity. For example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) show that 
issuers operating on a tight financial leash, would have exhausted cash reserves had they 
not received the offer proceeds. Consistent with their liquidity-need hypothesis, the notable 
characteristic concerning issuers' behavior is that most firms have very poor liquidity, as 
indicated by low cash and sufficiently high debt ratios, in relatively unconstrained industries 
to support their profitable business. 
4. Liquidity Management Around SEOs 
As shown in the previous section, assessing how issuers manage their liquidity around 
SEOs requires careful delineation between two liquidity scenarios (in the year preceding 
the offering). To capture a more complete picture, we model the periodic change in liquidity 
practices over the event window. Essentially, the two scenarios provide a static 
representation of liquidity information, while the latter reflects the trend effect in change 
They also document an opposing second-order effect on investment because increases in cash 
flow relax the constraints of low-liquidity firms more than their high-liquidity counterparts (as 
argued by Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999). We do not consider this possibility because 
issuers' cash flow distributions are similar to low-liquidity industry non-issuers. 
° Investment opportunities may arise within "windows of opportunity", for example, through rapid 
technological evolution or customer instability (See Maksimovic & Pichler, 2001). Alternatively, 
the findings mirror recent work of Acharya et al., 2007), where they predict that constrained 
firms prefer higher cash stocks in order to hedge investment against future income shortfalls. 
10 Shyarn-Sunder and Myers (1999) investigated a sample of large firms with rated debt and, as 
argued by Acharya et al. (2007), are comparable to their sample classification of unconstrained firms. 
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of liquidity over time. The two cases are interrelated with one another in the sense that 
the liquidity position accumulates the effects of previous liquidity changes and ) in particular, 
a constrained liquidity position can also restrain a manager's ability to manage liquidity. 
4.1. specification 
To detect liquidity management, we investigate patterns in the issuers' common sources 
of funds as reported in the cash flow statement. Analysis of these cash receipts facilitates 
better understanding of the liquidity policy and the impact of the equity issuance on fund 
flow and financial conditions. We specify a cross-sectional industry regression model to 
capture issuers' normal levels of liquidity changes for each fiscal year. Our model setup is 
in the spirit of the earnings management literature (see, e.g., Tech, Welch, & Wong, 1998; 
Roychowdhury, 2006), in which variation in the determinants of liquidity management are 
homogeneous across firms within the same industry and fiscal year. The model is estimated 
using all non-issuing firms in the same two-digit SIC code as the issuer, and re-estimated 
for each year in the investigation window from years -3 to +3, relative to the fiscal year of 
the issue. 
The model formalizes the intuition that firms adjust their funding resources (i.e. 
liquidity policy) to support incremental funding needs from business activities. Specifically, 
for each of the sources of fund items, we estimate: 
SOURCEr	 I	 SOURCE. 
	
avwc 
A 	 +fl2ç-7+fl3 Aj,. +1i4AMB1+E	 (1) 
where, for fiscal year t and industry firm i, SOURCE represents one of four sources of 
funds: change in cash (ACASH), change in short-term debt (ASTD), asset sales (ASALE) and 
change in long-term debt (ALTD). iNTis internal funds, defined as [operating income before 
depreciation minus (interest expense minus interest income) minus (income taxes minus 
deferred taxes)] plus aNwC. zNWC is change in net working capital, defined as change in 
current assets minus acAsH minus change in current liabilities plus /2SSTD. AMB is change 
in market-to-book ratio. A is total assets. Detailed variable definitions (and all remaining 
cases) are provided in Appendix A. The set of coefficient estimates from Equation (1) are 
then used to model the issuer-specific "normal" source of funding level and deviations 
from the normal levels are termed "abnormal". 
Intuitively, the source of funding (SOURCE) is expressed as a linear function of liquidity 
allocation. Firms can allocate liquidity to support the previously established financial 
opportunity set as represented by the own-lagged SOURCE variable. For example, if there 
is no change to the financial environment (i.e. prospective financial opportunities and 
associated payoff distributions) from the previous year, then liquidity policy will also remain 
the same this year. 11 Similarly, liquidity is allocated to support opportunity set changes in 
any of the three segments in the cash flow statement. Firms can allocate liquidity to support 
change in the financing and investment opportunity set in this period. Thus, INT proxies 
for the change in needs from financing and investment in the current period. The variable 
ANWC, is included to capture the change in the operating liquidity available to a business, 
11 Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) support the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to 
allow for the relation between lagged and current decision variables because firms are usually 
engaged in projects that may take longerthan one yearto complete. They argue that by excluding 
the lagged variable, the modeling relation may sufferfrom an omitted variables bias. In the R&D 
context, Berger (1993) also includes the lagged variable as a regressor to address the first order 
autocorrelation found in the residuals. 
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we implicitly assuming that the profit margin on funding is fairly stable within an industry. 
Finally) zM8 is intended to capture the change in growth expectations as an exogenous 
variable. 
The unscaled intercept term controls for a potential mean effect such that the average 
abnormal value calculated is centered at 0 for all industry regressions. The scaled intercept 
term is to remove the spurious correlation problem induced by the use of total assets as a 
common divisors (Barth & Kallapur, 1996). All variables are scaled by beginning-year total 
assets. In developing the above model, we do not suggest or require that a significant 
relationship exist with all the explanatory variables. Rather, we expect some degree of 
joint significance across them and an insignificant intercept because the collectively 
exhaustive nature of the chosen variables should encompass the entire range of possible 
needs in financial activities. 
Forthe purposes of comparison, we also evaluate financial performance using accrual-
based and real activities management models. Specifically, we report the estimated 
abnormal accruals (ACC) from Jones' (1991) earnings management model, and the 
estimated abnormal production costs (PROD), abnormal discretionary expenses (D/SEXP) 
and abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) from the real activities management model 
of Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (1998), as implemented in Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010). Rather than identifying potential manipulation activities in the year 
before the offering, our intention is to examine the effect of equity proceeds, as a liquidity 
injection, on period-to-period change in real activities and earnings performance. For 
example, if the equity proceeds are used for new product development, we would expect 
an abnormal increase in discretionary expenses as initial outlay, and subsequently, increases 
in abnormal cash flow from operations when the new product generates future cash flows. 
See Appendix A for variables and descriptions of models. 
To provide insights on some properties of the coefficient estimates, we report the 
weighted average of the coefficients estimated from each of the 9062 cross-sectional 
industry-year regressions, where the weights are equal to the inverse of the associated 
standard errors of these estimates divided by the sum of the inverse of all standard errors 
from the regressions. The weighted average provides a more economically meaningful 
measure than a simple mean because it takes into account the different variability of the 
sampling distribution of the dependent variable associated with the estimated coefficient 
in each regression sample .12 That is, the coefficient estimated with a large standard error 
(i.e. smaller regression sample or with less random variation) is assigned a lower weight to 
indicate the degree of imprecision contributing to the mean calculation.'3 
12 The inverse-variance weighting method is typically used in statistical meta-analysis to combine 
results from multiple studies. The analysis increases statistical power by reducing the standard 
error of the weighted coefficient and shrinks the confidence interval around it (e.g. Cohn & Becker, 
2003). 
' Also note that the estimates from a particular regression model represent liquidity resource 
allocation that is regarded as "normal" liquidity management practice specific for that industry 
and year. To capture all possible liquidity strategies, we do not predict the sign and significance 
of the coefficients but allow the coefficientto capture liquidity strategies under different business 
environments. Because one could argue that industry liquidity characteristics are too 
heterogeneous, we also report the number and percentage of significantly (at the 5% level) positive 
and negative results to illustrate the broader nature of the coefficient distribution. Finally, the 
adjusted R 2 is a simple average across regressions. 
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4.2. Results 
Table 5 presents the median abnormal liquidity management proxies around seasoned 
equity offerings. We separate the SEO sample into constrained and unconstrained groups 
based on the pre-issue net debt ratio and follow the group throughout the event period. 
With respect to the interpretation of results, the two groups yield some unique aspects 
which could deem the standard aggressive/conservative interpretation insufficient. 16 For 
instance, if the issuer is operating under a tight liquidity position, then a series of negative 
changes in liquidity would indicate a restrictive (as opposed to conservative) policy - 
because the firm can only channel limited funds under current levels of liquidity. That is, 
we expect the interpretation to differ across the two liquidity scenarios. To further assist 
in the interpretation of fund use and effects to firms' operational and earnings performance, 
we also report results for the median abnormal measures using the accrual-based and real 
activities-based earnings management models (as specified in Appendix A). 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results for the group of issuers with a net debt ratio 
belowthe pooled industry median in the year preceding the offer, that is, those with higher 
cash stock and limited debt capacity within the financially constrained (high-tech) industries. 
Starting from the pre-offering period, the median abnormal measures of the four sources 
of funds are mostly negative and significant (with the exception of Es CASH in years-1), The 
pattern is consistent with a conservative liquidity strategy relative to their industry peers, 
where issuers tend to limit access to liquidity in anticipation of future investment 
opportunities. This finding also conforms to Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) and 
the survey results reported by Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010), where constrained firms 
tend to hedge against the possibility that information friction might prevent them from 
funding valuable investment opportunities in potential good times ahead. 
Consistent with Kim and Weisbach (2008) and McLean (2011), we find that the median 
abnormal change in cash (AC,45H; 0.4685) is significant and positive and substantial in the 
year of the SEO. Thus, constrained issuers exhibit the same precautionary motive and 
stockpiling of cash proceeds as documented in the literature. In addition, there is a 
significant increase in abnormal discretionary expenditure (DISEXP; 0.1341) in year 0 and 
consecutive cases of positive abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO; 0.1061, 0.0756, 
0.0661) from year 1 onwards. These results support the interpretation that high-tech issuers 
are undertaking new product developments, in which the project typically impacts future 
cash flows through a product lifecycle (i.e. introduction, growth and then decline) with 
initial discretionary expenses directed towards marketing and development objectives." 
Together with the significant positive abnormal discretionary accruals (ACC) in year 0 and 
year 1, our results suggest that the liquidity injection is at least partly being used for cash 
stockpiling, new investment and improving existing operations.18 
Earnings management studies tend to interpret a series of positive (negative) measures as 
aggressive (conservative) management strategy. 
For example, new product introduction would involve initial outlays such as R&D and promotional 
expenses. In the growth stage, sales begin to rise and firms realize substantial profits. Through to 
the "decline" stage, the successful product attracts competitors to enter with duplicate products, 
reducing its market share and profitability. 
" Unlike Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we did not interpret our results in year 0 in terms of real 
activity manipulation. Since we are analyzing a subset of issuers (in constrained industries), the 
measures within this subset are clearly of a different proportion and magnitude compared to 
unconstrained issuers in Panel B. An unreported test of median difference is significant at the 1% 
level.
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Table 5 
Time Profile of Median Abnormal Liquidity Management Proxies Across SEO Issuers 
This table reports the time trend of abnormal liquidity-based, real activities-based and accrual-based manage-
ment proxies from year -3 to year +3 relative to the issue year 0 (the fiscal year of reporting after the issue 
date). The first four rows represent abnormal sources of funds (SOURCE) estimated as the deviations from the 
predicted values from the following industry year regression: 
SOURCE1A,,,a,+a,f'J/A)-I-1J,(S0URCE,., 1A,,1)+sA/1V7,/A,1+$,(aNwc.,/A,,.,)+13AMB,--c, 
where, for fiscal year rand industry firm i, SOURCE represents one of the four sources of funds: either change 
in cash (ACASH), change in short-term debt (MID), asset sales (ASALE) and change in long-term debt (ALTO). 
!NTis internal funds. ANWC is change in net working capital. AMB is the change in market-to-book ratio. A is 
total assets. The next three rows represent abnormal real activities management estimated as the deviations 
from the expected production costs (PROD), discretionary expenses (D!SEXP) and cash flow from operations 
(Cm) following Roychowdhury (2006). The last row represents abnormal earnings management estimated as 
the deviations from the expected accruals (ACC) following Jones (1991). See Appendix A for variable defini-
tions. The regressions are estimated for every event year and for every issuer two-digit SIC industry. Issuer's 
industry must have at least 15 non-issuing firms to be included in the estimation. Reported results are summa-
rized by median across issuers partitioned into two groups based on the cut-off point of 0.01 in net debt/assets 
in the year preceding the offerings. The same group of issuers is followed throughout the investigation win-
dow. Panel A refers to the constrained' group with net debt/assets lower than 0.01 and Panel B to the 
'unconstrained' group with net debt/assets higher than 0.01.',' represent statistical significance levels at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, using Wilcoxon p-values for the group median. 
Year	 -3	 -2	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 3 
Panel A: Constrained issuers (with net debt ratio <0.1 at year -1) 
Abnormal ACASH	 0,0279b -0.0205 0.0148' 0.4685'	 00306' -0.0489' -0.0471' 
Abnormal ASTD	 -0.0059' -0.0098' -0.0136'	 -0.0138' -0.0053' -0.0059' -0.0085' 
Abnormal ASALE	 -0.0117' -0.0154' -0.0161'	 -0.0156' -0.0152' -0.0163' -0.0172' 
Abnormal ALID	 -0.0241' -0.0257' -0.0216'	 -0.0331' -0.0176' -0.0126' -0.0248' 
Abnormal PROD	 -0.0443' -0.0679' -0.0765'	 -0.0720' -0.0544' -0.0618' -0.0590' 
Abnormal DISEXP	 0.0227'	 0.0330' 0.0401'	 0.1341'	 -0.0842' -0.0786' 00687b 
Abnormal CFO	 00368' 00357' 0.0454' 	 0.0308	 0.1061' 0.0756' 0.0661' 
Abnormal ACC	 0.0138' 0.0039 0.0009	 0.0421' 0.0326' 0.0098	 0.0157 
N	 330	 433	 598	 534	 491	 458	 393 
Panel B: Unconstrained issuers (with net debt ratio 0.1 at year -1) 
Abnormal ACASH	 -00136' -0.0128 -0.0142' 0.0232'	 -0.0128' -0.0122' -0.0082' 
Abnormal ASTD	 -0.0033' -0.0011' 0.0002' 	 -0.0135' -0.0025' -0.0001' -0.0024' 
Abnormal ASALE	 -0.0080' -0.0090' -0.0084' -0.0086' -0.0090' -0.0104' -0.0103' 
Abnormal ALTO	 -0.0012' -0.0046' 0.0250'	 -0.0540' -0.0097' -0.0160' -0.0192' 
Abnormal PROD	 -0.0078' 0.0100' 0.0032' 	 -0.0098' 0.0061' 0.0041' -0.0029' 
Abnormal DISEXP	 -0.0641' -0.0567' -0.0520'	 -0.0551' -0.0675' -0.0764' -0.0780' 
Abnormal CFO	 0.0232'	 00237' 0.0211' 	 0.0201	 0.0283' 0.0375' 0.0356' 
Abnormal ACC	 0.0114'	 0.0133 0.0241	 0.0364' 0.0247' 0.0088 0.0124 
N	 604	 796	 1014	 967	 888	 821	 735 
Abnormal real activities measures are calculated as the deviations from the following industry-year regressions 
predictions: 
CFO,/A,=a,+ajl/A,1)+ajS,/A,,.j+a2(AS,/A,,.)+a,, 
Abnormal accruals measure is calculated as the deviation from the following industry-year regression prediction: 
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Panel B of Tab leS reports the results for issuers with net debt ratios above the pooled 
industry median, that is, those with very high debt and low cash within "unconstrained" 
industries. Recall from Section 3 that these issuers have likely exhausted their funding 
options and launch SEOs to resolve a tight operation "leash". From Table 5, we also observe 
over the pre-issue period a generally significant and negative pattern in the four sources 
of funds measures (with the exception of àSTD and LILTD in year -1). Together, these results 
indicate that the provision of liquidity is relatively restrictive during the 3 years leading up 
to the offering. 19
 Furthermore, the significant and positive abnormal change in long-term 
debt (aLTD; 0.0250) in year -1might indicate a debt trap situation, where an issuer resorts 
to new debt issue in order to cover existing debt payments. This is then followed by a 
significant reduction in abnormal change in long-term debt (-0.0540) and an increase in 
abnormal change in cash (0.0232) in the following year when the SEQ takes place. 
Thus, the findings suggest that insufficient liquidity causes constrained issuers to raise 
additional funds from outside capital. Scrutinizing the rear activities variables further down 
the rows in Tables, we find that the measures are noticeably more stable and of different 
magnitude compared to those reported for constrained firms in the Panel A (e.g., the 
median abnormal cash flows is within 0.020.04 here, while in Panel A, the range is between 
0.03 and 0.11). This suggests that the offering proceeds are not being used to improve real 
fundamentals or new investment, nor do firms manipulate real earnings before the offer. 
The post-issue median abnormal cash flow from operations, however, is around 1% higher 
than the pre-issue levels. The pattern of median abnormal accruals is quite similar to Panel 
A and peaks in years 0 and +1, respectively. 
In sum, our results illustrate that there are predictable patterns in how issuers manage 
liquidity around SEOs; these firms are conservative compared to industry non-issuers and 
have liquidity motives for the equity offer, being to raise funds to cover underlying liquidity 
constraints and/or to support investment. Our analysis further supports the liquidity-need 
hypothesis of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) and provides new insights on the 
integrative links between liquidity, SEOs and corporate decisions. The two-group 
classification also helps to avoid confronting effects on the median abnormal measurements 
and track abnormal patterns more reliably over time: one classification emphasizes the 
importance of liquidity constraints (i.e. extremely high net debt) and subsequent debt 
repayments; the other classification stresses the large cash and debt capacity of high-tech 
firms and product developments.20 
S. Association Between Post-issue Performance and Pre-issue Liquidity Management 
There are important reasons why a linkage might exist between pre-issue liquidity 
management and operating and stock market performance, post-issue. Most notably, a 
That is, the unconstrained issuer might have used very aggressive liquidity policies in the past 
such that debts accumulate and cash balances decrease to the point where the constraint on 
normal business operations is binding. 
As a robustness check, we repeat our analyses by using a measure based on performance- and 
net debt-adjusted matching. As argued by Kothari et al. (2005), studies that do not use 
performance-adjusted evaluation are likely to draw biased inferences. Accordingly, for each issuer-
year observation, we create a set of five byfive portfolios by sorting the industry non-issuers into 
quintiles of ROA and net debt/assets ratio measured a year prior to the estimation year. The 
results using these alternative measures are consistent with those reported in our main analysis 
and are not reported to conserve space. Full details are available from the authors upon request. 
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seasoned equity offering is a form of liquidity injection. If the issue decision is indeed 
motivated by liquidity concerns or a desire to pay down debt, then the management of 
liquidity pre-issue would potentially hold back on the offering proceeds available to carry 
out production and investment plans. Thus, firms with more aggressive liquidity policies 
will have fewer liquid resources available to support the normal operation of the business 
in the next period and this, thereby, reduces future operating performance. Alternatively, 
for constrained issuers who prepare for higher liquidity in anticipation of investment, we 
would expect those who have conserved more liquidity to improve their funding capacity 
(and, hence, the firm's ability to undertake new investment opportunities) and improve 
their operating performance post-issue. 
Accordingly, we examine both the cumulative change in operating performance (IsROA) 
and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) post-issue. The operating proxy, A ROA, is 
measured as income (Income before extraordinary items; Compustat item 123) scaled by 
beginning year total assets (following Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). Following Barber and Lyon 
(1996), we adjust the operating performance by a single control firm matched on pre-
issue 2-digit SIC code, ROA and net debt ratio. 2 ' Specifically, for each issuer-year, we identify 
all non-issuers within the same two-digit SIC group, return-on-assets (ROA) within ±30% 
or within ±0.01, net debt ratio within ±30% or within ±0.01 for the fiscal year preceding 
the offering. If no firms meet the criteria, we relax the industry criterion to a one-digit SIC. 
If still no firms meet the criteria, we disregard the industry criterion. Finally, if still no firms 
meet the criteria, we disregard the industry and ROA criterion. From this subset of firms, 
we select the firm with the net debt ratio closest to that of the issuer. We label the adjusted 
performance based on these control firms as "liquidity-adjusted". 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return performance is measured as follows. We construct 
return portfolios beginning the month after the issue, or four months after the previous 
fiscal year end, whichever is later. 22 The period is through to the end of the five-year period 
or until either the issuer or control firm delists, whichever is sooner. The BHAR for issuer i 
over the period from time a to time his defined as: 
SHAR Ia:b = flc a (1 + R) - II'(1 +	 (2) 
where Ri,ris the issuer's stock return in month t, Rco,l,t is the return of the control 
firm over the same time period. The average buy-and-hold abnormal return is: 
BfL4Ra.b = . 1Z i BHAR	 (3) 
where n is the number of firms in the sample. In evaluating the abnormal returns 
from the reference portfolios formed on alternative characteristics, Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999) show that controlling for size and book-to-market yield well-specified statistics from 
random samples. However, they also highlight that misspecification in non-random event 
samples is pervasive and that controlling for these factors alone is not sufficient to yield 
We further matched on pre-issue net debt ratio in order to better discriminate the two groups of 
issuers. 
22 The four-month lag follows Tech, Welch, and Wong (1998). It also fits our sample with shelf 
offerings likely to have shorter lags and firm-commitment offers to have longer lags. 
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well-specified test statistics. Here, we differ from this standard approach in that we re-use 
the control sample from the operating performance evaluation.' 3
 In doing so, it effectively 
facilitates a unified comparison of operating and market performance based on the same 
set of matching control firms. 
To capture the total effect of liquidity management, we combine the four individual 
measures to obtain a metric of aggregate liquidity management (LM). More specifically, it 
is computed as the sum of abnormal change in short-term debt, abnormal asset sales, 
abnormal change in long-term debt minus abnormal change in cash. To improve statistical 
inference under the liquidity- adjusted performance measures, we adapt Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley's (2005) approach to adjust the aggregate liquidity measure of issuers using a 
matched-firm design. Specifically, for each industry (based on two-digit SIC codes), we 
create a set of five by five portfolios by sorting the data into quintiles of ROA and net debt 
ratio prior to the year of the portfolio formation. The adjusted aggregate liquidity 
management is computed as the difference between the aggregate liquidity management 
of an issuer and the average of a portfolio matched on industry, ROA and net debt ratio a 
year prior to the estimation year. 
We model the long-run performance afterseasoned equity offerings using the following 
two regressions: 
6ROA 1.. = a0
 + a,LM,_, + a,RM, 1- a 3 EM 1
 + a;ASALHu, + 
a 5 CAPX10
 + a5ADEBT 1, 1- a 7ACASH 0 + a3PSIIARE1 _ 1 -1- a9 YEAR +	 ( 4) 
BHAR,	 a + a1 LM_ 1
 + a 3Ne9àROA 0.,. 1
 + a 3 RM 1 + 
a,HM ,_ 3
 + a5 SALE 0
 + a 6 CAPX + a,tDEBT + a8A CASk,0 +	
(5) 
a,PSHARE ,_ 1
 + +a10S1ZE,_ 1 +a 31 BM ,_, + a32 YEAR 1
 + s, 
where, for issuer,, AROA is the tth event year liquidity-adjusted cumulative change in return 
on assets relative to the base year 
-1; BI-L4R is the p-year liquidity-adjusted buy-and-hold 
abnormal return; LM is an aggregate measure of the previously defined liquidity 
management proxies at year -1, defined as the difference between the aggregate abnormal 
sources of funds of an issuer and the average aggregate of a portfolio matched on prior-
year return-on-assets, net debt-to-assets and industry; kM and EM are proxies for aggregate 
real activities management and earnings management at year -1 (based on previously 
defined measures), both are also adjusted by the prior-year ROA, net debt and industry-
" That is, the operating and returns performance measures are both adjusted by industry, return 
on assets and net debt ratio of matched non-issuers, using the same control sample. There are 
several reasons why it is of particular interest. First, it is potentially informative from an investor 
perspective to compare the return performance of issuing firms to a control firm based on similar 
operating performance and industry characteristics. Second, following Lyon et al. (1999), industry 
clustering and performance reversal are two potential sources of misspecification that are 
commonly overlooked in tests of long-run abnormal returns evaluation. The industry distribution 
ofSEO samples, as illustrated in Table land among many previous studies, are unevenly clustered 
across two-digit SIC codes. Moreover, return performance also tends to be unusually high pre-
issue and reverses after. Assuming a positive return on assets (ROA)-expected return relation 
(recently recognized by Chen, Novy-Marx, & Zhang, 2011), this return reversal can be proxied 
using return on assets. 
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matched portfolio; /sSALE, ACA PX, /sDEBTand /sC4SH are the asset scaled change in sales, 
change in capital expenditures, change in debt and change in cash in the year of issue 
(year 0); PSHARE is the percentage of primary shares offered; SIZE and BM are the log of 
market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio priorto the equity offers (year -1). The 
term NegAROA is a logarithmic scaled proxyfor the extent of downward movement in the 
reported operating performance within the pth portfolio year (corresponding to event year 
p-i) relative to the level reported within the commencing year (event year 0), where 
NegAROA is multiplied by -1 ifc 0 and is setto 0.0001 otherwise. YEAR are dummy variables 
to control for year effects. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
Despite the apparent appeal of liquidity management and the substantial literature 
on earnings management (e.g. Tech, Welch, & Wong, 1998) to predict long-run 
underperformance, we believe that these explanations are unlikely to be the only reason 
for this phenomenon. Here, we include a second possibility based on our unified 
investigation across operating and return performance (under the same set of control 
benchmarks). Specifically, we argue that existing studies evaluate the returns from post-
issue undertaking of positive NPV projects without controlling for the transitory/permanent 
nature of these projects. For example, if a firm issues seasoned equity to fund a transitory 
investment opportunity, then we would expect an initial rise in performance that later 
tapers off. When subsequent cash flows are not sustained, investors may revise the firm 
value down against the remaining expected cash flows from the transitory investment .24 
To measure the possible effect of investors' downward revision of possible transitory 
investment, we construct a measure, NeqLxROA, that captures the subsequent downward 
deviation in the liquidity-adjusted operating performance relative to year 0. Accordingly, 
we assume that investors face uncertainty in the long-term nature of the investment 
opportunity and rely on the abnormal operating profit observed at year 0 as a reference 
point. When subsequent abnormal profits deviate negatively from this figure, investors 
update their beliefs that the investment is of a transitory nature (i.e., has a short lifespan 
without replacement) and revise downward the perceived future cash flows from the 
investment. Thus, we expect that the negative deviations can also lead to a long-run decline 
in market performance. 
The two models also include a number of control variables based on the prior SEQ 
long-run underperformance literature. In particular, kM and EM control for the portion of 
underperformance attributable to real activities and accrual-based earnings management 
(Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). LXSALE and CAPX control for the portion of underperformance 
attributable to rapid growth in sales and capital expenditure in the issue year (Loughran & 
Ritter, 1997). IsDEBTand /xCASH control for the influence of change in financing activities 
in the issue year to long-run performance (Billett, Flannery, & Garfinkel, 2011). PSHARE is 
24 Note that our argument here is not the same as the real-investment-based explanation, which 
points to a negative relationship between investment opportunities and expected return as 
characteristics related to risk. Hirshleifer, Hou, Tech, and Zhang (2004), however, (footnote 6), 
considered several alternative ways that investment could be correlated with future profitability 
and investor perception. One example that they identify is investment to replace fixed assets 
that are rendered obsolete by adverse events, leading to value-increasing investment but lower 
future profits. Another example is that certain expenditures that are unlikely to provide long-
term payoffs are classified as investments ratherthan as expenses, and if investors fail to discount 
fully for this possibility, they will tend to overvalue firms with high investment levels. Our 
arguments here closely mirror this point. 
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Table 7 
Regression analysis of long-run return performance on pre-issue liquidity management. 
This table reports results from median regression estimates of the equation; 
BHAR,0.,= ;+ aLM,,+NegAROA., , ,+ aRM.,+ a4EM.,. ;ASALE. 0 ;CAPX, Q +a,AOEBT, Q +aa CASH,0 
+a9PSHARE,,+a,0SIZF,,+a,,BM,1+a,2YEAR,+,. 
The dependent variable is the p-year buy-and-hold returns, computed as the paired difference between the 
BHAR of issuer and that of control firm matched by pre-issue 2-digit SIC, ROA and net debt ratio. The main 
independent variables are; pre-issue aggregate liquidity management (LM); and (NegAROA), which is a proxy 
for investors downward adjustment to expected abnormal profit remaining from the issue-invest opportunity, 
measured as the negative deviation of current year liquidity-adjusted RDA relative to the level in year 0, where 
negative deviations are multiplied by -1 and non-negative deviations are set to 0.0001 before taking the log 
transformation. Control variables are defined in notes to Table 6. SeeAppendix A for variable definitions. The 
group "constrained" and "unconstrained" tracks the long-run performance of the subset of firms having net 
debt ratio below and above the pooled industry median of 0,01, respectively. The f-statistics (represented in 
parentheses) are based on the bootstrapped standard errorswith 5000 replications.", * represent statistical 
significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The last two rows reports 
the median BHARs, from Wilcoxon signed rank tests (', 'denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels). 
Variables
Constrained issuers (LO) 
1-year	 2-year	 3-year	 4-year 
BRAR	 BHAR	 BHAR	 BHAR
Unconstrained issuers (HI) 
1-year	 2-year	 3-year	 4-year 
BHAR	 BHAR	 BHAR	 BHAR 
LM, -0.085 0.015 0.163 0.140 -0.085 0.004 -0.065 -0.064 
(-0.55) (0.07) (0.50) (0.21) (-0.87) (0.03) (-0.32) (-0.20) 
NegAROA01 -0.059" 0 . 092***0. 041 0.085***0.091*** 0.084* 
(-2.39) (-2.68) (-0.81) (-4.90) (-4.64) (-2.96) 
RM, 0.004 0.093 0.064 0.097 0.027 0.069 0.082 0.081 
(0.09) (1.53) (0.57) (0.60) (0.77) (1.29) (0.93) (0.57) 
EM, -0.041 -0.140 -0.120 -0.127 -0.033 -0.056 0.016 0.048 
(-0.80) (-2.24) (-1.15) (-1.16) (-0.52) (-0.59) (0.14) (0.28) 
ASALE 0 0.065 0.188 0.324 0.150 0.063 0.122 0.162 0.148 
(0.48) (0-87) (1.23) (0.36) (0.76) (0.84) (1.24) (0.73) 
aCAPXe -0.134 -0.713 2.225 -1.889 -0.185 -0.561 -0.628 -1.847 
(-0.11) (-0.35) (0.82) (-0.47) (0.31) (-0.63) (-0.47) (-1.44) 
áDEBT, -0.143 -0.311 -0.194 -0.530 0.107 -0.014 0.166 -0.201 
(-0.42) (-0.76) (-0.42) (-0.55) (0.92) (-0.06) (0.57) (-0.58) 
LXCASH0 -0.019 -0.081 -0.141 -0.037 0.226 0.092 0.114 0.551 
(-0.20) (-0.68) (-0.82) (-0.11) (1.46) (0.40) (0.36) (1.16) 
SIZE 1, BM1 
& PSHARE, Not reported Not reported 
YEAR YES YES 
N 285 233 190 145 645 535 437 354 
Pseudo R 2 7.18% 9.63% 19.00% 1026% 2.91% 7.27% 8.09% 8.49% 
Med. BHAR -4.47% -10.06% -10.04W -11-84W -1-10% -2.40% -10.38%' -7.77% 
(pre-SEO) BHAR, 82.49%a (pre-SEO) BHAR, 	 =50.54%a
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The median pre-issue BHAR (from time -1 to 0) for the constrained issuers is at 82.49%. 
This translates into a four-year BHAR of 60.88% (i.e. (1 + 82.49%) * (1— 11.84%) . 1). For 
the unconstrained group, the pre-issue BHAR in the announcement year is 50.54% and 
the four-year BHAR of 38.84% (i.e. (1 + 50.54%) * (1— 7.77%) —1). This means that investors 
do impound the liquidity information of issuers and partially discount the offering 
information into stock prices in the year of the SEQ announcement. 
Delving into the regression estimates, the results generally show no evidence that 
post-issuance market underperformance is related to pre-issue aggregate liquidity 
management, with the estimated LM coefficients all insignificant across years and for both 
groups of issuers. The estimated coefficients on the year 0 control variables, in all cases, 
are also insignificant. We interpret these results, given the pre-SEO BHARs shown in Table 
8, as suggesting that investors correctly impound the impact of the liquidity and offerings 
information on the expected year 0 cash flows into stock prices accordingly and as such) 
when year 0 cash flows are realized, investors are not surprised and no revision of stock 
prices is needed." Results also show that the 2-year BHAR is significantly negatively 
associated with pre-issue EM for credit-constrained issuers. Because the EM measure 
appears to be predominately negative (with an untabulated median of -0.O24 for the group), 
this means that in the cross-section, issuers with poorer pre-issue abnormal accruals 
perform significantly better two years after the SEOs relative to their respective control 
matches. 
Finally, what can we say regarding the ability of the transitory investment (NeqLiRQA) 
measure to explain longer-run market underperformance? Consistent with our prediction, 
we find that transitory investment has very significant and negative impacts on the 2-year 
and 3-year BHARs for both groups of issuers, with t-statistics above -2.3 and -4.6 for 
constrained and unconstrained issuers, respectively. In terms of economic significance, a 
one median absolute deviation increase (276.85% and 330.65% in constrained and 
unconstrained samples, respectively) in the log scaled NegaROA is associated with abnormal 
performance declines of 25.47% (= 276 .85%*0 . 092) and 30.09% (= 330 . 65%*0 . 091) in 3-
year BHARs for the former and latter groups, respectively. These results again support the 
explanation that investors face uncertainty in the long-term nature of investment and by 
observing how subsequent abnormal profits deviate from predicted, investors update their 
beliefs that the investment is transitory and discount stock prices accordingly. 
As a final piece of analysis we examine the buy-and-hold abnormal return performance 
of issuers based on two alternative methods to generate benchmark control firms: (1) a 
size- and book-to-market- matched sample, and (2) a size-, book-to-market- and net debt/ 
assets matched sample. Table 8 reports the results. Overall, the table indicates a BHAR 
pattern comparable to the liquidity-adjusted (industry-, performance- and net debt-
17 This interpretation is consistent with Shivakumar (2000) in that manipulation behaviors are 
observed by investors at the time of SEOs and investors lower their assessment of next period 
surprises from the adverse consequences of manipulation, and rationally discount firm value at 
the time of these offerings. Moreover, any significantly negative relationship detected between 
BHAR and a variable is interpreted as surprises not being picked up at the time of SEOs, rather 
than as evidence of poorer firms leading to underperforriiance. Further, the surprise is better 
quantified by the difference between the subsequent realized value towards the level predicted 
at the time of SEOs. This explains why the variables in our model are mostly unable to detect a 
significant relation in the longer run except for NegaROA because it better proxies the surprises 
towards the level predicted at the time of SEOs. 
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Table 8 
Long-run Stock Performance Following Seasoned Equity Offerings 
This table reports buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the sample issuers using alternative control firms 
matching procedures: fhl'?a:b = (1 /tI) Y. 7=1 BHAR .a:b where n is the number of issuers in the sample 
over the period o tot. The yearly BHAR are estimated relative to time 0 - the month after the issue date, or 
four months after the fiscal year end preceding the issue, whichever the later, and through the end of the five-
year period. The buy-and-hold abnormal return is the difference between the BHAR of the issuer and the 
matched control firm. The control firms chosen are not required to have monthly returns available throughout 
the event period. Size- and RIM- adjusted return is the paired difference between the raw return of the issuer 
and the control match chosen within 10% market capitalization of the issuers and the smallest absolute difference 
in book-to-market ratio. Size- )
 B/M- and net debt- adjusted returns is the paired difference between the raw 
return of the issuer and the control match chosen within 20% market capitalization and book-to-market of the 
issuers and the smallest absolute difference in net debt ratio. The groups "constrained" and "unconstrained" 
refer to the subset of firms having net debt to assets below and above the pooled industry median at 0.01, 
respectively, in the fiscal year preceding the offerings. Returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Numbers 
in brackets are Wilcoxon p-values for the median. 
Buy-and-hold returns relative to matched firms 
Portfolio	 BHAR,Q BHARe BHAR02 SHARe, BHARe BHARe 
(pre-SEO) (1-year) (2-year) (3-year) (4-year) (5-year) 
Panel A: Size- and BM- adjusted results 
Full sample	 5658% -0.29% -624% -1104% -915% -16.19% 
[000] [0.75] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [000] 
Constrained	 7452% -141% -6.69% -1660% -1850% -28.21% 
[0.00] [0.87] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [000] 
Unconstrained 4824% -0.15% -622% -5.69% -6.99% -1170% 
[0.00] [064] [0.03] [0.06] [0.111 [0.03] 
Panel B: Size-, BM- and net debt- adjusted results 
Full sample	 51.92% -1.19% -11.39% -1041% -17.36% -2006% 
[000] [0.50] [0.00] [0.00] [000] [000] 
Constrained	 64.70% 033% -2.24% -808% -2.98% -7.62% 
[0.00] [0.73] [023] [0.01] [006] [004] 
Unconstrained 47.40% -2.63% -1773% -11.97% -18.98% -21.89% 
[0.00] [024] [000] [000] [0.00] [0.00]
matched) benchmark employed above. The mean one-year to five-year BHARs for the size-
and book-to-market-matched sample are 0.31%,-10.74%,-19.23%,-26.20% and -4236%, 
respectively. The conventional t-statistics are all significant from the second year onwards. 
In Panel B, we observe that controlling for additional net debt decreases some of the 
underperformance. The liquidity-adjusted method shows further decreases in the mean 
BHARs (especially in the unconstrained group) and smaller t-statistics. Overall, these results 
are consistent with the underperformance documented in previous literature. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that liquidity management impacts post-issue operating 
performance (for unconstrained issuers); aggressive issuers have lower transitory profit 
compared to their conservative counterparts in the cross-section. In contrast, post-issue 
stock performance is better described by the forward-looking behaviors of investors: 
liquidity information is observed/realized at the time of SEOs, while subsequent 
underperformance is related to the investors surprise relating to the transitory nature of 
the issue-investment decision. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper provides a systematic study of liquidity practices around SEOs. It shows, through 
the examination of the link between liquidity policy and financial constraints, that the 
effect of liquidity management has important implications on the way firms conduct their 
issuing decisions and investment policies. Our analysis points to an investment timing 
motive behind constrained issuers' cash management policies, where in the presence of 
financing frictions, they prefer saving higher cash so as to match up funding capacity for 
upcoming investment. In contrast, unconstrained issuers are characterized by their 
alarmingly high debt and low cash (i.e. high net debt) levels - pointing to the motivation 
to conduct the SF0 to resolve near-term liquidity problems. 
To probe further into atypical liquidity management behaviors around SEOs, we 
examine period-to-period changes across four Sources of funding measures: change in 
cash, change in short-term debt, asset sales and change in long-term debt. Using a modeling 
setup analogous to that of the earnings management literature, we find that constrained 
issuers are relatively conservative (compared to industry non-issuers) in pursuing their 
liquidity policies pre-issue, and tend to stockpile cash proceeds and increase investment 
(e.g. through real investment activities such as expenditures on R&D) post-issue. This 
contrasts with unconstrained issuers, whose liquidity policies are fairly restrictive (given 
high net debt levels) building up to the offer. Furthermore, we do not find much of a 
stockpiling effect and real investment, post-issue. Overall, the analysis further demonstrates 
the differential effect of corporate liquidity governing the two groups of issuers. 
Finally, our evidence on post-issue performance differs from existing relevant studies 
in that we propose a unified comparison of both operating and return performance under 
the same liquidity-matched control sample. Our analysis indicates that operating 
performance improves within 2-3 years post-issue and then diminishes. This transitory 
operating improvement, however, is accompanied by a deteriorating return performance. 
For unconstrained issuers, we find a negative relation between pre-issue liquidity 
management and post-issue operating performance (i.e. aggressive liquidity management 
leads to subsequent decrease in performance). However, such a relationship is not 
replicated in the post-issue returns analysis. Indeed, liquidity information is observed by 
investors at the time of offering and does not constitute a future Surprise. Rather, post-
issue market underperformance can be attributed to investors' downward revisions related 
to the transitory nature of investment opportunities from the SEOs. 
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RM.' Aggregate real activities management is captured 
following Zang (2012) and is calculated as Abnormal 
PROD minus Abnormal DISEXP, adjusted by the average 
of a portfolio matched on industry, RDA and net debt/ 
assets a year prior to the estimation year 
EM, Abnormal ACC, adjusted by the average of a portfolio 
matched on industry, RDA and net debt/assets a year 
prior to the estimation year 
MALE, Change in sales, scaled by beginning total assets SALE [121, AT [6) 
ACAPX Q Change in capital expenditure, scaled by beginning CAPX [128], AT [6] 
total assets 
ADEBT0 Change in long-term debt, scaled by beginning OUT [91, AT [6] 
total assets 
ACASH Ø Change in cash and cash equivalents, scaled by CHE [1], AT [6] 
beginning total assets 
PSHARE Percentage of primary shares offered PRIMSHR_SHARES from SDC 
database 
NegAROA0, , The natural logarithm of the cumulative liquidity-
adjusted change in ROA reported within portfolio 
year 0 to p, where the cumulative measure is multiplied 
by -1 if c 0, and set to 00001 otherwise 
SIZE 0 Log of market capitalization 	 og(Share price PRCC, CSHO [25] 
* Common shares outstanding) 
BM 1 Book-to-market ratio = Book value of equity/(Share ByE, PRCC, CSHO [25] 
price * Common shares outstanding)
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